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ABSTRACT
According to the Verizon 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report, 321 POS terminals (user
devices) were involved in data breaches in 2017. These data breaches involved standalone
POS terminals as well as associated controller systems. This paper examines a standalone
Point-of-Sale (POS) system commonly used in smaller retail stores and restaurants to extract
unencrypted data and identify possible violations of the Payment Card Industry Data Secu-
rity Standard (PCI DSS) requirement to protect stored cardholder data. Persistent storage
(flash memory chips) were removed from the devices and their contents were successfully ac-
quired. Information about the device and the code running on it was successfully extracted,
although no PCI DSS data storage violations were identified.
Keywords: POS device, PCI DSS, compliance, data extraction, chip-off
1. INTRODUCTION
Data breaches involving Point-of-Sale (POS)
devices are becoming commonplace. These
breaches are happening in many industries,
and no industry seems to be immune (Ch-
eney et al. 2012). A shortlist of recent POS
breaches would include restaurants (Apple-
bee’s, Arby’s, Sonic, Chili’s, Zippys’, Sub-
way, etc.), health care facilities (Oregon
clinic), hospitality facilities (Holiday Inn,
Hyatt), and various retail stores (Forever 21,
Target (Manworren et al. 2016), Home De-
pot, etc.). Even POS vendors, payment sys-
tems, and service providers such as Harbor-
touch, DataPoint POS, and Heartland Pay-
ment Systems (Cheney, 2010), are not im-
mune (Verizon, 2018).
Many POS systems consist of a worksta-
tion or server (controller) running a main-
stream operating system and a POS termi-
nal or device that reads the card. In such
systems, the controller executes the process-
ing and communication tasks. Other POS
systems consist only of a POS device or ter-
minal, which has the capability to store and
process some subset of the card and trans-
action data, and the device or terminal also
communicates with a remote system to ex-
ecute the transaction. Past breaches have
involved the standalone POS terminals or
devices, while other breaches have involved
an accompanying POS controller or server,
which are often running an MS Windows
operating system (Bodhani, 2014). Past
breaches have been attributed to a lack of
security on the victim’s POS terminal, POS
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controller, and the data network on which
the POS systems reside and how they com-
municate.
This paper presents a forensic first look at
a common POS device found in smaller retail
and restaurant establishments, specifically a
VeriFone device deployed under the Verizon
brand. These particular devices were se-
lected for their widespread adoption in small
and medium-sized businesses more likely to
have weak security programs (Lueck, 2014),
their standalone design, which implies un-
protected sensitive data will be on these de-
vices instead of a separate controller, and
their ready availability on the resale mar-
ket. These devices were examined to identify
plaintext operational information with secu-
rity implications and to determine whether
they violated the data storage requirement
of the PCI DSS standard. An ”Existing
Data/Specimens” form was filed with one
of the author’s Institutional Review Boards
(IRB) for human subjects research in the
event that PII was found or is found in the
future, although none has been found to date
in this work.
2. INTRODUCTION
TO PCI DSS
”PCI DSS is the global data security stan-
dard adopted by the payment card brands
for all entities that process, store or transmit
cardholder data and sensitive authentication
data. It consists of steps that mirror secu-
rity best practices” (PCI Security Standards
Council, 2018).The main goal of PCI DSS is
to protect cardholder data using the PCI se-
curity standards.These standards ”apply to
all entities that store, process, and transmit
cardholder data. It covers technical and op-
erational system components included in or
connected to cardholder data” (PCI Secu-
rity Standards Council, 2018).For a broad
understanding of how PCI DSS is structured,
please see Seaman (2020)
PCI DSS requirement 3 focuses on pro-
tecting stored cardholder data. ”Cardholder
data refers to any information printed, pro-
cessed, transmitted, or stored in any form
on a payment card” (PCI Security Standards
Council, 2018).
Guidelines to protect cardholder data in-
clude:
1. Store data only as long as necessary for
business
2. Sensitive authentication data should
not be stored after authorization (even
if it is encrypted)
3. Only display either the first six or last
four digits of the primary account num-
ber (PAN).
4. Encrypt the PAN when stored
5. Clearly, document procedures to pro-
tect encryption keys
6. Implement procedures to protect en-
cryption keys
Specific guidelines on how to protect the
data are in Appendix 2.
Storage of certain data elements on a pay-
ment card is permitted; for example, the
PAN can be stored with no encryption. This
may seem contradictory to the guidelines
mentioned above, but the difference is that
the PAN can be stored with no encryption,
but only the first six or last four digits of
the PAN can be displayed. The cardholder
name, service code, and expiration date can
be stored but must be encrypted (in the Tar-
get case, such data was encrypted, but not
immediately; Plachkinova & Maurer, 2018)).
The full track data (the data on the magnetic
stripe), the 3-4 digit verification value (CAV,
CVC, CVV, or CID), and the PIN cannot
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be stored in any form. Storage guidelines
for cardholder data elements are in Table 2
(PCI Security Standards Council, 2018).
3. LITERATURE
REVIEW
A literature review was conducted to deter-
mine if any research had been done related
to extracting unencrypted data and identi-
fying possible violations of the PCI DSS re-
quirement to protect stored cardholder data.
However, the authors found little evidence of
similar research on this topic. Most of the
related research found pertained to the se-
curity of POS devices and their compliance
with PCI DSS, not the forensic examinations
thereof.
Souvignet and Frinkenc (2013) explored
using differential power analysis as a digi-
tal forensic tool on skimming devices often
found attached to POS devices. Payment
card data skimming consists of the illegal ac-
quisition of payment card details when a user
is paying at a POS device. They proposed
a non-invasive method to gain forensic evi-
dence from the POS device. Rogers (2017)
gives a cursory look at POS devices and dig-
ital forensics pertaining to that, while Guo
and Jin (2010) presented a range of devices
available for manipulating magnetic stripe
card data, demonstrate the ease by which
magnetic stripe cards are often fraudulently
cloned and analyze how such devices can be
processed in a forensically sound manner.
Smith (2014) found that POS system at-
tacks were generally quite simple and pre-
dominantly involved guessing passwords and
subsequent installation of keyboard loggers
on smart cash registers used and gave recom-
mendations to improve POS system security.
Amrichová and Mézešová (2019) pre-
sented a pseudo code for a secure string class
that is compliant with the data retention
and cryptography requirements of the PCI
DSS standard. Gomzin (2014) provides a
resource that ”goes beyond standard PCI
compliance guides to offer real solutions on
how to achieve better security at the point of
sale.” Frisby et al. (2012) investigated sev-
eral smartphone POS systems that used an
audio-jack magnetic stripe reader.
Several researchers explored the costs of
PCI DSS compliance and non-compliance.
Morse and Raval (2008) discussed and eval-
uated the basic framework of PCI DSS and
its legal implications. Shaw (2010) ex-
plored using PCI DSS compliance to encour-
age merchants to meet those security stan-
dards. Kidd (2008) discussed the penalties
and business risk of non-compliance while
Rees (2010) discussed why companies find
it difficult to understand what is required of
them in PCI DSS compliance, as did Clapper
and Richmond (2016).
Sarrafpour et al. (2019) attempted to
break or bypass the PCI DSS security mea-
sures using varying degrees of vulnerability
and penetration attacks in a methodological
format.
4. THEORETICAL
JUSTIFICATION
Point of sale devices, and embedded sys-
tems in general, consist of four common
functional components: persistent storage,
volatile memory, a processor, and communi-
cations elements. Persistent storage contains
the device firmware (bootloader and oper-
ating system), configuration data, and pos-
sibly other data written during operation.
Volatile memory (RAM) and processor con-
tents are interesting only for a running sys-
tem (Rodŕıguez, 2017; Sherstobitoff, 2008;
Hizver & Chiueh, 2011), and communication
elements are interesting for the data they
transmit on a live system as well as possi-
ble access vectors. We are specifically inter-
ested in residual and security-relevant data
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available on a dead system, so we focused on
persistent storage. In the case of the POS
systems we examined, this persistent stor-
age is made up of a ROM chip containing a
bootloader and a flash memory chip soldered
to one of the device’s printed circuit boards.
The flash memory on an embedded device
like a POS system will contain operating sys-
tem and related executable code, typically
in compiled form. Configuration informa-
tion, possibly including user account infor-
mation, will also be stored in persistent stor-
age. Additionally, the running system may
write transactions or other data to the flash
memory. The contents of the flash memory
may be encrypted in whole or in part us-
ing on-chip encryption or off-chip encryption
implemented in hardware or software. Our
goal in this work is to extract the raw con-
tents of the flash memory and determine the
data that can be extracted and the possible
security implications of access to that data.
5. MOTIVATION
Recently one of the authors visited a restau-
rant and paid with a credit card. The POS
device was relatively small and was the type
that contacts the payment system provider
directly via a telephone call. The call did
not succeed, and after a few seconds, the
POS device printed two receipts. This wor-
ried the author somewhat – was his payment
information (name, credit card information,
transaction information) still on the POS de-
vice, and if so, how long would it remain
there until it was processed?
The author noted the make and model of
the POS device and contacted the payment
system provider (Heartland Payment Sys-
tems). Heartland provided no help, except
to state that they only provide the credit
card charging system and that any other in-
formation would have to come from Verizon.
A call was made to Verizon customer sup-
port for VeriFone devices. During this call,
the author learned that the transaction in-
formation is only on the POS device un-
til processed, and the unprocessed transac-
tions are cached until batch processing can
be done later in the day. They did not pro-
vide details on when the batch processing
would occur as it can be done manually or
automatically (daily time set by the device
operator). When the batch process is fin-
ished, the transaction information is deleted.
This information caused the author con-
cern: what if the POS device was stolen
before the batch processing is performed,
and is the transaction information securely
deleted?
6. DEVICE
ACQUISITION
One of the authors bought three used POS
devices via craigslist. All were of the Veri-
zon brand and were Verifone models; one was
an Omni Vx570 model, and two were Omni
Vx610 models. These devices are the same
type that the author had observed in his
restaurant incident. The two Vx610 devices
were owned by a catering company (food
truck) whose owner said they only connected
to process transactions in the evening. The
Vx570 model was owned by a bakery. One
of the Verifone Vx610 models used for this
examination is shown in Figure 1.
7. DATA
EXTRACTION
This section will detail the data extraction
efforts. The first attempt included printing
data, followed by a Joint Test Action Group
(JTAG) access attempt and a chip-off ex-
traction.
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Figure 1. Verifone Vx610 POS device.
7.1 Initial extraction
It was decided to power up one device and
see if any data could be extracted from it.
The data extraction began with powering on
the Vx570 device and printing the last trans-
action. The printout began with a summa-
ry/detail report of transactions, which in-
cluded the device owner’s name, address,
and phone number, followed by the informa-
tion on the last batch processed (date, time,
batch#, terminal ID, list of transactions,
their dollar amount, and total). This was
followed by two printouts of the last trans-
action (customer copy and merchant copy),
which included:
• Device owner, address, and phone num-
ber
• Terminal ID #
• Transaction date & time
• Credit card type & last 4 digits of the
credit card number
• Transaction amount
• Credit card owner name
• Transaction approved/not approved
• Batch #
• Authorization number
These transaction copies were followed
again by a summary and detailed report of
transactions as shown in Figure 2.
The Vx570 device was briefly disassem-
bled and reassembled to get a quick look
at the motherboard. Disassembly involved
removing the cover and disconnecting the
printed circuit board assemblies and their ac-
companying cables (see Fig. 4).
After reassembly, the device was turned
on, and it immediately displayed an error
message on the screen: ”Security Alarm,
Tampering Detected [20000] Please reboot”.
This message is known to be triggered by
physical disassembly of the device case.
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Additionally, on one of the Vx610 de-
vices, a Verix Multi-Application Conduc-
tor (VMAC) Summary Report was printed,
which contained information about the ter-
minal: the OS version, the terminal type,
the terminal serial number, RAM, FLASH
memory, and GID information (see VMAC
Summary Report in Figure 3).
We also printed a VMAC Detail Report,
which included a VMAC Summary Report,
followed by Group Details for each applica-
tion group.
After these two reports were printed, the
device was connected to a computer via
its USB and Ethernet ports, but the com-
puter did not recognize that a device was
connected. A wifi connection attempt also
failed. This confirmed the entries on the
VMAC detail report, which stated that Wifi
and Ethernet were not supported on this ter-
minal and the USB port was disabled.
7.2 Digital extraction – Joint
Test Action Group
(JTAG)
JTAG forensics is an advanced level data
acquisition method that involves connecting
to Test Access Ports (TAPs) on a device
and instructing the processor to transfer the
raw data stored on connected memory chips.
When supported, JTAG is an effective tech-
nique to extract a full physical image from
devices that cannot be acquired via exist-
ing exposed interfaces (Binary Intelligence,
2013). JTAG interfaces provide connections
to specific pins on a chip (TDI, TDO, TMS,
TCK, and optionally TRST), and hence pro-
vide the ability to read data from (and write
data to) a chip in the JTAG chain with-
out damaging the hardware, e.g., via chip-
off, which is difficult to ”undo.” JTAG is
often used to test chips and circuits after
manufacturing and PCB mounting and be-
fore release. However, because JTAG inter-
Figure 2. Last Transaction Report.
faces provide direct chip control and possibly
access to proprietary information, JTAG in-
terfaces are often hidden or disabled prior
to public release, and the chip-specific com-
mands to read and write data via JTAG are
often not publicly released.
An online search did not reveal known
JTAG interfaces for the POS devices under
examination, so we inspected the PCBs upon
disassembly. There is no single form factor
for JTAG interfaces, although the most com-
mon for ARM processors (these devices use a
Samsung S3C2410AL-20 chip with an ARM
processor) are two-row 14- and 20-pin lay-
outs (SECONS, 2008). Neither of these was
apparent on the PCBs as either pin headers
or unpopulated pads. However, the PCBs
did have two separate groups of unpopu-
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Figure 3. VMAC Summary Report.
lated pads, one row of 6 pads with 3 vis-
ible trace connections and another row of
12 pads with 10 visible trace connections.
We probed these pads to identify VCC and
ground but did not find a pattern consistent
with a known JTAG layout (which typically
has multiple contiguous ground pads in ad-
dition to the 4 or 5 JTAG connections). Us-
ing a JTAGulator device, we also attempted
connections to multiple different pad com-
binations in these two groups without ob-
taining a successful connection. While a
JTAG connection and chip access may have
still been possible, it likely would have been
time-consuming and may not have been pos-
sible at all if the JTAG connections were de-
stroyed in some way (blown fuse, etc.) or
non-existent in the first place. Since we
did not need to maintain an operating de-
vice after obtaining flash contents, we shifted
our approach to a destructive but likely-to-
succeed chip-off attempt.
7.3 Chip-off data extraction
The VeriFone Vx610 devices were disassem-
bled to expose the printed circuit board as-
semblies. The Printed Circuit Board As-
semblies (PCBA) were inspected to identify
non-volatile flash memory components capa-
ble of data storage. For each POS device,
a single Spansion flash memory chip model
(S29)GL032N90FFI02 was located upon re-
moval of the PCBA electromagnetic shield-
ing.
The research was completed to determine
the Spansion GL032N90FFI02 particulars.
The manufacturer technical datasheet for
the S29GL-N family of devices was obtained
from www.alldatasheet.com and reviewed.
This revealed that the target chip is a NOR
based flash memory component with a stor-
age capacity of 4 megabytes. Specifically,
the component is a 32-Mb device organized
as 2,097,152 words or 4,194,304 bytes with
a 16-bit wide data bus. While the part is
available in multiple chip packages, our tar-
get component was determined to be the 64-
ball fortified BGA (ball grid array) package
option (Figure 4).
The UP&UP UP-828P chip programmer
control software was then checked to con-
firm read/imaging support for the target
part. The UP-828P did show explicit sup-
port for the GL032N90FFI02, and the nec-
essary EBGA64P chip adapter was available.
The control software was further checked to
verify that the indicated part organization
and capacity matched the values detailed in
the chip datasheet. The control software
presented the chip organization as ”200000h
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x 16-bit,” which corresponds to the 4,194,304
bytes and 16-bit data bus as detailed in the
datasheet.
The devices each had a 4MB flash mem-
ory chip (Figure 5), and the extraction effort
supplied both raw chip-off images as well as
a copy where the byte order was reversed
(RBO2). Data were extracted from both
Vx610 devices.
Figure 4. Vx610 Motherboard.
Figure 5. Flash Memory Chip.
With imaging support verified, the chip-
off acquisitions were performed. There
was no visible chip underfill or coating, so
no adhesive removal was necessary. The
GL032N90FFI02 chips were removed using
a Zephyrtronics ZT-7 hot air reflow unit per
the following steps:
• The PCBA was mounted to the work
cradle
• The PCBA was preheated using a
Zephyrtronics AirBath digital preheat-
ing unit @ 205◦C
• RMA-223 flux paste was applied around
and under the target chip
• The ZT-7 reflow unit nozzle was posi-
tioned over the target chip
• The ZT-7 reflow unit was engaged to
ramp to a setpoint of 285◦C
• The ZT-7 vacuum probe was activated
for automatic chip removal
The target chips automatically lifted when
the ZT-7 reflow unit nozzle temperature
reached approximately 280◦C. After cooling,
the removed chips were cleaned using 99%
isopropyl alcohol in an ultrasonic cleaner.
Once clean, the chips were inspected for the
presence of solder bridges, excess or insuffi-
cient solder amounts on each pad, and any
other areas in need of correction. No correc-
tions were required for the target chips.
Each target chip was imaged using a
UP&UP UP-828P universal chip program-
mer per the following steps:
• An EBGA64P chip package adapter was
attached to the UP-828P programmer
unit
• The UP-828P control software version
2.0.4.8 was launched
• The control software was configured to
read the target chip by selecting the
S29GL032N90FFI02 chip profile
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• The READ function was used to down-
load the chip data into the control soft-
ware buffer
• The VERIFY function was used to re-
read the chip data and compare it to the
buffer contents
• The verified chip data was saved to a
binary image file
The Spansion GL032N90FFI02 chips were
successfully imaged with no errors, and the
verification process yielded identical data.
At 4,194,304 bytes, the file sizes of the saved
binary images matched the expected size as
detailed in the chip manufacturer datasheet.
This confirms that we acquired true and ac-
curate forensic grade copies of each chip’s
data.
The chip-off procedure and imaging were
completed in accordance with accepted dig-
ital forensic industry standards and prac-
tices. MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 crypto-
graphic hash values were calculated imme-
diately after data acquisition and could be
utilized to verify data integrity during anal-
ysis.
After the chip-off data extraction, the
extraction team performed a big/little en-
dian conversion by reversing the byte or-
der so that ACSII strings would be human-
readable. It is these converted files that were
subsequently analyzed.
8. ANALYSIS AND
RESULTS
Both flash images were examined for PCI
DSS protected data, specifically cardholder
and authentication data. Using the avail-
able last transaction data to seed explicit
searches, then searching the extracted data
using regular expressions based on PCI DSS
protected data and transaction data formats,
we found no protected or transaction data
in clear text (such as card type, transaction
amount, cardholder’s name, last 4 digits of
the card number, etc.) in either image file.
The two flash images were then examined
in a hex editor for strings, similarities, and
differences (image md5 hashes are different
to establish what other information might be
available). 1 2
Extracted data indicates that both units
ran the Verix v Operating System on 68k
processors (Motorola 68000; 32-bit CISC).
The kernel is located in bytes 0-65535 (64
KB); this is the first 128 sectors assuming
a 512-bytes sector size. Differences in these
first 128 sectors began at byte offset 827 and
continued at byte offsets as noted in the par-
tial list below:
827, 1167, 1910-1911, 1918, 1923, 3119,
3563, 3586-3587, 626-3627, 3983, 4027, 4071,
4278-4279, 4330-4331, 4731, 4759, 4763,
4955, 5843. . .
Byte differences at the locations above are
all in the 4th (if one) or 3rd and 4th octets
(if pair) of 4-octet groups; these look like
op codes for a 32-bit processor, and the last
byte or last two bytes of each 4-octet op code
is/are the op code’s arguments (e.g., mem-
ory address, register, etc.) (Golden Crystal
(date unknown). Device serial numbers and
kernel versions are near the end of the ker-
nel block (∼bytes 65310-65527). The serial
number is the bold string starting with 212
or 213, and the kernel version is the bold
string starting with V.QB.
kernel 1: VX610 US M25654336USDD
00000212-318-169160960790312806411
10/02/2009 V.QB0111A3 ”2.5.2”
kernel 2: VX610 US M25654336USDG
00000213-696-415161351220312806411
08/14/2009 V.QB0111A2 ”2.5.1A”
The flash file system begins after the ker-
1kernel 1 hash:16521FB7808153E5A52E2994FD78BFF1
2kernel 2 hash:AF3A27BE64838A2FD10B79CE611BE558
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nel, located at byte offsets 65536-573440
(sector 128-1119). The file system range was
identified after finding the files, as described
below. Sector 1120 starts with 0xFFs; non-
0xFFs are at various sectors (different in
each image, but both start at sector 1152).
In order to identify files in the images, file
names were identified by first finding the
load list (bytes 129640-129975 in these im-
ages). The load list contained the following
filenames and is the same in both images. All
files were found in the flash images except
wizard.ram (I: indicates RAM file system).
• B: crypto.ram
• B:schedulr.bin
• B:iic.bin
• B:clk 6900.bin
• B:clk 3610.bin
• B: upgrade.tmp
• B: buf mgr.bin
• B:bpr.bin
• B:com1 .bin
• T: info.bin
• T:console.bin
• U:security.bin
• U:pipe mgr.bin
• V:icc1.bin
• W:ipp.bin
• Y:usb host.bin
• Y:cdma usb.bin
• Y:usbd.bin
• Y:com2 .bin
• Y:com3 .bin
• Z:mag.bin
• Z:printer.bin
• Z:battery.bin
• I:wizard.ram
File contents were found by first searching
for the file name from the load list, then
identifying a common precursor byte string
that indicated the start of a new file. Most
but not all files in the two images used con-
stant precursor byte strings: kernel 1 used
0x09100214, and kernel 2 used 0x09081411.
Files were identified at the locations noted in
Table 1 in the Appendix. Differences noted
in bold red (file contents were not directly
compared); start/end/size are byte offsets in
decimal; end and size are estimated based on
the start of the next file. VLR files are screen
messages.
More files were found by searching for
drive prefixes (capital letter followed by a
colon), then looking for that file name in
other locations. For these files below (a par-
tial list), file data follows the filename by
about 40 bytes:
• certfile.sys
• modprof.s37
• ASC8X21.VFT
• ASC4X16.VFT
• SPUTIL.VFT
• VCS 8X16.vft
• VCSLOGOS.VFT
• VMAC.LIB
• cdma.p7s
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• cdma.out
Using strings and manual examination of the
remainder of the data in the images (sectors
1120-end) revealed the following potentially
useful but not fully explored items:
• Multiple locations in image 1 and 2:
”PREDATOR” (user? also in ped.lib)
• Sector 1400 (image 1) and 1322 (image
2): FTP user (anonymous) and pass-
word (guest@vfi.com);
• Sector 1773 (image 1) and 1695 (im-
age 2): ”Password:” and ”66831” (a
known default access code for down-
loads, time/date changes, etc. (Veri-
fone, 2012)
• Variable ”*GO” in configuration file
sets the startup program, both set
to F:APLOAD.OUT (this file was not
found on either flash image)
• Sector 1389 (image 1), 1311 (image 2):
Banshee.Carlos Only.CO561
Only..Carlos+CO561....MC56
Only...MC55 Only...
EM3420 Only.CO710
Only..Carlos+MC56.Carlos+MC55.
Carlos+EM3420 ... Car-
los+CO710....Eisenhower
The rest of the image files contained mostly
compiled code and suspected encrypted data
(based on data entropy); the rest contained
clear text entries of error messages, infor-
mational messages, initialization messages,
menu items, file names and locations, con-
figuration settings, and device information.
9. DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
The analysis results suggest that most of the
data is either binary code or encrypted data,
and the clear text appears to contain only
informational and error messages, configura-
tion information, and some access informa-
tion.
IP information such as network configura-
tion (DNS, DHCP, IP addresses, etc.) was
in clear text, as was an FTP username and
password, presumably used for non-sensitive
downloads.
The last transaction could be printed,
which indicates it is present in the non-
volatile flash memory. However, no card-
holder or transactional data was found in
clear text in the extracted flash images,
which likely indicates that transactional and
cardholder data that is retained is also en-
crypted. Given that no sensitive authenti-
cation data was printed, no evidence of PCI
DSS data storage violations was identified.
The most common data breaches that in-
volve POS devices are caused by some type
of malware. The devices we examined did
not exhibit signs of being infected with mal-
ware, though because this examination was
focused on ensuring PCI DSS compliance,
we did not investigate for malware beyond
a cursory look.
10. FUTURE
RESEARCH
This paper analyzed a single model of POS
system, and the analysis has only begun. We
intend to explore and analyze the acquired
image files more fully and to analyze addi-
tional POS devices.
Additional analysis will also examine the
Verix v Operating System and code appar-
ently running on these POS systems.
Lastly, we hope to acquire similar POS de-
vices and their accompanying payment sys-
tem services so we can control the configu-
ration data and transaction data in order to
trace it through the system and enable more
detailed searches.
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PCI DSS Quick Reference Guide: Pro-
tect Cardholder Data (PCI 2018, 14-
15)
Cardholder data refers to any information
printed, processed, transmitted or stored in
any form on a payment card. Entities ac-
cepting payment cards are expected to pro-
tect cardholder data and to prevent its unau-
thorized use – whether the data is printed or
stored locally or transmitted over an inter-
nal or public network to a remote server or
service provider.
Requirement 3: Protect stored card-
holder data
Cardholder data should not be stored unless
it’s necessary to meet the needs of the busi-
ness. Sensitive data on the magnetic stripe
or chip must never be stored after authoriza-
tion. If your organization stores the Primary
Account Number (PAN), it is crucial to ren-
der it unreadable (see 3.4, and Table 2 for
guidelines).
3.1
Limit cardholder data storage and retention
time to that which is required for business,
legal, and/or regulatory purposes, as docu-
mented in your data retention policy. Purge
unnecessary stored data at least quarterly.
3.2
Do not store sensitive authentication data
after authorization (even if it is encrypted).
See the table below. Render all sensitive au-
thentication data unrecoverable upon com-
pletion of the authorization process. Issuers
and related entities may store sensitive au-
thentication data if there is a business justi-
fication, and the data is stored securely.
3.3
Mask PAN when displayed (the first six and
last four digits are the maximum number of
digits you may display), so that only au-
thorized people with a legitimate business
need can see more than the first six/last four
digits of the PAN. This does not supersede
stricter requirements that may be in place
for displays of cardholder data, such as on a
point-of-sale receipt.
3.4
Render PAN unreadable anywhere it is
stored – including on portable digital me-
dia, backup media, in logs, and data received
from or stored by wireless networks. Tech-
nology solutions for this requirement may in-
clude strong one-way hash functions of the
entire PAN, truncation, index tokens with
securely stored pads, or strong cryptography.
3.5
Document and implement procedures to pro-
tect any keys used for encryption of card-
holder data from disclosure and misuse.
3.6
Fully document and implement key manage-
ment processes and procedures for crypto-
graphic keys used for encryption of card-
holder data.
3.7
Ensure that related security policies and op-
erational procedures are documented, in use,
and known to all affected parties.
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kernel 1 kernel 2
filename start end size start end size
flashmgr.ram 65600 75519 9920 65600 75519 9920
crypto.ram 75568 79603 4036 75568 79603 4036
schedulr.bin 79652 102399 22748 79652 102399 22748
iic.bin 102448 103727 1280 102448 103727 1280
clk 6900.bin 103776 109223 5448 103776 109223 5448
clk 3610.bin 109272 115511 6240 109272 115511 6240
upgrade.tmp 115560 123391 7832 115560 123391 7832
buf mgr.bin 123440 124871 1432 123440 124871 1432
bpr.bin 124920 125487 568 124920 125487 568
com1 .bin 125536 129591 4056 125536 129591 4056
loadlist.sys 129640 131087 1448 129640 131087 1448
sysmode.out 131136 196623 65488 131136 196623 65488
pedgrdfa.out 196672 202767 6096 196672 202767 6096
ped.lib 202816 226495 23680 202816 226495 23680
info.bin 226544 230211 3668 226544 230211 3668
console.bin 230260 262159 31900 230260 262159 31900
unzip.out 262208 270375 8168 262208 270375 8168
security.bin 270424 308235 37812 270424 308283 37860
pipe mgr.bin 308284 327695 19412 308332 327695 19364
smipp.out 327744 332815 5072 327744 332815 5072
smresdl.out 332864 339983 7120 332864 339983 7120
icc diag.out 340032 356999 16968 340032 356999 16968
icc1.bin 357048 393231 36184 357048 393231 36184
sys.lib 393280 436803 43524 393280 436735 43456
ipp.bin 436852 459855 23004 436784 459855 23072
usb host.bin 459904 473155 13252 459904 473155 13252
cdma usb.bin 473204 482215 9012 473204 482215 9012
usbd.bin 482264 491563 9300 482264 491563 9300
com2 .bin 491612 496347 4736 491612 496347 4736
com3 .bin 496396 524303 27908 496396 524303 27908
timezone.vlr 524352 529651 5300 524352 529651 5300
sm text.vlr 529700 536195 6496 529700 536195 6496
dlerr.vlr 536244 536595 352 536244 536595 352
dlmsg.vlr 536644 537255 612 536644 537255 612
mag.bin 537304 545211 7908 537304 545211 7908
printer.bin 545260 564907 19648 545260 564907 19648
battery.bin 564956 572927 7972 564956 572927 7972
Table 1. File Locations in the Kernels (1)
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Table 2. Guidelines for Cardholder Data Elements (PCI 2018, p15)
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